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FLEXIBLE HOUSEHOLD LABOR SUPPLY MODEL 

Arie Kapteyn, Peter Kooreman, and Arthur van Soest* 
Ahstruct-In  the  first  part  of  this  paper  we  derive  explicit 
expressions for the direct utility function, conditional demand 
equations, and concavity conditions in both price/income  and 
quantity space for the demand system introduced by Hausman 
and Ruud (1984). These results are then used  in an empirical 
static  family  labor  supply  model,  in  which  kinked  budget 
constraints and unemployment  benefits  are taken into account 
for both  spouses.  Imposition  of concavity  is  necessary  for 
consistent estimation and the concavity constraint appears to 
be binding. 
I.  Introduction 
T
HE larger  part  of  the  recent  labor  supply 
literature  is  devoted  to  the  explanation  of 
female  labor supply decisions, thereby addressing 
the theoretical  and econometric problems  associ- 
ated with non-participation, non-linear and non- 
convex  budget  sets  and  stochastic  specification 
(see,  for  example,  Heckman  (1974),  Hausman 
(1979,  1980,  1985), Moffitt  (1986),  Arrufat  and 
Zabalza  (1986),  Blundell and  Meghir  (1986)  and 
Blundell, Ham and  Meghr (1987)). In these pa- 
pers,  male labor  supply decisions usually play  a 
role only through the (by assumption  exogenous) 
explanatory  variable  "other  household  income," 
which includes male labor earnings. 
In  this  paper  we  adopt  the  more  general  ap- 
proach of  modelling male and female labor supply 
simultaneously. First of  all, there is some evidence 
that  the exogeneity assumption  of  "other  house-
hold income" in female labor supply models is not 
always  tenable;  see  Smith  and  Blundell  (1986). 
More importantly, male and female labor supply 
decisions within a household are likely to be fun- 
damentally interrelated  and  a full 
of  a  household's  labor  supply  behavior  requires 
taking this interrelationship into account in setting 
up the empirical model. 
The joint  modelling of  male and female labor 
supply creates some specific problems in addition 
to those encountered in modelling individual labor 
supply. One of  the issues is how to represent  the 
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household  members'  preferences. We  will follow 
the  approach of assuming  that preferences 
can  be  represented  by  a joint  household  utility 
function with male leisure, female leisure and total 
consumption as arguments. 
A  second  issue  that  comes  up  specifically in 
joint  male  and  female labor  supply is 
that  one  usually  also  has  to  derive  conditional 
supply equations, i.e., equations that give optimal 
labor supply of  a household member, given a fixed 
number of  hours of  labor supply by  the partner. 
For  example,  if  the  female  stops  working,  the 
functional form of  the male labor supply equation 
changes from its notional  to its conditional form 
(assuming absence of  other quantity constraints). 
For popular flexible functional forms (in the sense 
of  Diewert (1974)), such as the Almost Ideal De- 
mand  Systems  and  the  Indirect  Translog,  the 
derivation of conditional  commodity demand or 
labor  supply  equations  is  a  cumbersome  affair, 
and closed forms  can generally not  be  obtained. 
See, for example Kooreman  and Kapteyn (1986). 
It appears that at this moment there exist only 
two flexible forms suited to deal with conditional 
equations and unconditional  equations in  a rela- 
tively  tractable  way.  The  first  one is  the  direct 
quadratic utility function, which was used for this 
kind of  problem by  Wales and Woodland  (1983) 
and by Ransom (1987a, b). A second one has been 
introduced by  Hausman and Ruud (1984). Since 
the properties of  the Hausman-Ruud system have 
not been discussed in the literature extensively, we 
provide  a rater  of  the 'Ystem, 
including the derivation of  the conditional labor 
supply equations, the computation of  direct  util- 
ity,  and the imposition of  concavity  in wages of 
the  expenditure  function.  The  need  to  compute 
direct utility in an arbitrary point of  the choice set 
may arise if  the budget set is non-convex, in whch 
case different local utility maxima on convex sub- 
sets of  the budget set have to be compared. Impo- 
sition of  concavity is sometimes necessary in em- 
pirical  applications, as the likelihood  function of 
the model may not be well-defined if  concavity is 
not satisfied. 
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The practical importance of  these issues will be 
illustraTed in section IV by an empirical example. 
In section V we make a brief comparison between 
the direct quadratic and the Hausman-Ruud sys- 
tem.  There  we  also  discuss  the  importance  of 
modelling the labor supply of  spouses jointly. 
11.  The Hausman-Ruud System 
A.  The Model 
A household  is  assumed  to maximize a utility 
function with male leisure, female leisure and total 
household  consumption as its arguments. We as- 
sume that  the expenditure function in real terms 
corresponding to maximization of  the utility func- 
tion under a linear full income constraint is of  the 
Gorman Polar Form type introduced by Hausman 
and Ruud (1984): 
where  w = (w,,  wf)',  the  husband's  and  wife's 
concavity is equivalent to 
B = p*/3/3' - A is negative definite.'  (3) 
From now on we  assume that  A is non-singular. 
Note  that,  if  PfA-9 # 0,  a  necessary condition 
for concavity is given by 
If  /3 # 0  and  P'A-9 = 0,  then  B  is  negative 
definite for no value of  p*. This case is excluded 
from now on. In the special case that A is positive 
definite, it is  easy to prove  that  (3')  is not  only 
necessary  but  also  sufficient for  (3).  (See,  for  a 
proof of  a more general result, Bekker (1986).) 
The application of duality theory strongly hlnges 
on the concavity condition; without this property, 
there is no utility maximizing problem behind the 
labor  supply  equations. Therefore, (3) must hold 
for  all  relevant  (w, p),  including  shadow  wages 
and corresponding virtual incomes. 
C.  The Direct Utility Function 
(real) after tax wage rates;  u is household utility  Non-convexity of  the budget set makes it neces- 
sary  to compare  the  values  of  the  direct  utility  level; and A = (  8 =  6 = (ti7 tfl7  (4. 
function in  different  points.  We  shall  derive  the 
and 8 are parameters. 
The  corresponding  indirect  utility  function  is 
given by 
u(w,p) = p*exp(P'w), 
P* = e +  + tjfw+ +W'AW,  (1) 
where  p  denotes  the household's  real  non-labor 
income. 
Application of  Roy's identity yields the follow- 
ing labor supply functions: 
h* = 6 + p*P + Aw,  (2) 
where  h* = (h;,  hf*)' is  the  vector  of  optimal 
numbers of  worlung hours of  husband  and wife, 
respectively. 
B.  Concavity 
The use of  the function given by (1) is limited 
by the usual regularity conditions on expenditure 
functions.  For  this  specification, only  concavity 
has  to be  considered,  i.e.,  the  matrix  of  second 
order  partial  derivatives of  the  real  expenditure 
function must  be negative definite. Homogeneity 
of  degree zero and monotonicity with respect to u 
are satisfied automatically. It is easy to show that 
direct  utility  function  by  calculating  the  utility 
level in some arbitrary point (h,,  h  f,  y ), where y 
is the household's real income: 
Let  k  be the vector  h - 6, where  h = (h,,  hf)'. 
Given (h,,  hf, y), we first seek (shadow-)wages w 
and corresponding non-labor income p satisfying 
k = p*P + Aw  (5) 
P*  =  + e + sfw + +W'AW  (6) 
p = y - h'w.  (7) 
Equations (5) through (7) yield, after substituting 
(7) into (6): 
Substituting (8) into (9) yields a quadratic equa- 
l B is just  the Hessian of  the expenditure function. Since the 
expenditure function is defined in terms of  real wages (wages 
divided by the price of  consumption), the usual condition that 
the Hessian of  the expenditure function is negative semi-defi- 
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tion in p*: 
and if  p* is known, w can be found from (8): 
Thus (w, p) can be determined iff  (10) has a real 
solution, i.e., iff 
1 +~1~-~{kf~-1k-2(y+0))  (12) 20. 
A solution is only feasible if  it satisfies concavity 
condition (3). Obviously, if P = 0, the solution of 
(10) and (11) is unique and it satisfies (3) if  and 
only  if  A is positive definite. If  P # 0 and  (12) 
holds,  then  (10)  and  (11)  yield  (at  most)  two 
solutions (w, p*) and only the smallest of  the two 
satisfies the necessary condition (3'): 
If  this solution satisfies (3), then it is feasible and 
the utility level follows from (1): 
~(h,,  hf, Y)  = p*exp(Pfw).  (14) 
The reader  should  be  aware  of  the  relation  be- 
tween  invertibility  (i.e.,  the  question  whether 
(w,,  wf, p)  can  be  solved  as  a  function  of 
(h,,  h,, y)) and concavity (i.e., good behavior of 
the diiect or indirect utility function). As usual in 
dually  specified  systems,  concavity  can  only  be 
checked  in  (h,,  hf, y)-space  if  invertibility  is 
guaranteed,  since it  involves  (shadow-)wages. In 
the special case that A is positive definite, (3) and 
(3')  are equivalent. This implies that, if  (w,,  wf, p) 
can  be  found,  exactly one  solution  satisfies  the 
concavity  conditions. Thus,  in  this  special  case, 
"invertibility guarantees concavity." 
D.  Rationed Labor Supply 
In  this  subsection,  we  derive  rationed  labor 
supply functions, i.e., labor supply for one individ- 
ual if-for  some reason-the  partner's number of 
working hours is fixed. This means that the house- 
hold  maximizes utility, taking into account  some 
binding  constraint  on  one  of  the  three  goods. 
Rationed supply functions can be determined  us- 
ing shadow-wages and shadow-income (see Neary 
and Roberts (1980)).2 We  derive the female's ra- 
tioned labor supply h  f, for given  h,,  actual wage 
rates  w,  and  wf,  and non-labor  income p. (The 
male's rationed labor supply can be derived in the 
same way.) We search for a shadow wage rate 
and corresponding ji,  such that 
If  a feasible solution (k, ji)  (with corresponding 
ji*)  is found, optimal female labor supply is given 
by 
System (15) implies 
with  a, =  -h,  + P,{p  + 0 + hmwm+ afwf 
+ iyfw?)  + ayf + am, a1 =  + Pm{-hm  + am + awf ), a, = Ifimym.  If  (17) has no real solution, 
no shadow wage can be found and  hf  cannot be 
determined. (17) has a real solution iff 
.  , 
If  is found, then ,ii, ,ii* and hf  follow immedi- 
ately from (15) and (16). The solution is feasible 
iff it satisfies concavity condition (3). 
We focus on the "regular"  case, i.e, Pmym  z 0. 
If  (18) holds, the solutions for  are 
w, 
-
= --Pi1 + (h, - 6,  - awf)/yrn 
*(Pm~m)-lfi. 
The corresponding value of ,ii*is 
,ii*= P;'yrn  T pi2@.  (19) 
Since /3;2YmP/3' - A  is indefinite or semi-definite 
and /3Pf is positive semi-definite, it is easy to see 
Rationed supply functions can alternatively be determined 
using  first  order  conditions  for  maximization  of  the  direct 
utility  function,  which  is  explicitly  derived  in  section  IIC; 
subject to the budget constraint and the rationing levels. 58  THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 
that only one solution can be feasible:  the labor market. Particularly in The Netherlands, 
- actual  hours  are not  only  determined  by  labor 
W,  = -Pi1 + (h, - 8,  - a~~)/~, 
supply  decisions  of  the  household,  but  also 
+ (Pmym)-lfi.  (20)  strongly depend  on  institutional constraints and 
Note  that,  even in the special case of  a positive 
definite matrix  A, this solution is not necessarily 
feasible; condition (3) should always be checked. 
Thus, the relation between  "partial  invertibility" 
and  concavity is  different  from  the  relation  be- 
tween  "full  invertibility"  and  concavity,  as  dis-
cussed in Section IIC. 
In this  section we  derived  the  conditional  fe- 
male labor supply function h (wf, h,,  p + wmhm) 
corresponding to household preferences given by 
(14). The result is a closed form expression for hf. 
Lundberg (1988) follows a different strategy: She 
starts with conditional demand functions in some 
convenient  form  and  does  not  discuss  the  issue 
whether  it is possible to find  a household  utility 
function  corresponding  to  these  equations.  Our 
approach  has  the  advantage that  a  closed  form 
expression of  the indirect utility function is avail- 
able. As a consequence, it is easy to check whether 
the underlying system of  preferences satisfies regu- 
larity properties (e.g., concavity) and it is possible 
to use non-convex budget sets. 
111.  Applications 
The rationed labor supply functions derived in 
section IID can be  applied in  several situations. 
The most  common example is  the nonnegativity 
constraint  for females. If  this restriction is  bind- 
ing, the husband's labor supply function should be 
replaced by  a rationed labor  supply function, as 
described in section IID. 
A  similar situation  arises if  individual budget 
sets  are piecewise  linear  and  convex  (see,  e.g., 
Blomquist (1983) and Hausman (1979)), as in the 
case  where  spouses  file  separately  and  the  tax 
system is progressive and piecewise linear. If, for 
example,  the  optimal  number  of  the  husband's 
working  hours  is  at  a  kink,  then  female  labor 
supply-is not given by (2) but by  the conditional 
labor supply function given in section IID. If  the 
budget set is non-convex, comparison of  values of 
the direct utility function, derived in section IIC, 
is necessary to determine the optimum. 
Apart  from constraints arising from the  shape 
of  the  budget  set,  restrictions  may  stem  from 
demand side factors or institutional constraints on 
demand side factors. Possibilities to work a non- 
standard  number  of  hours  are rare.  It  therefore 
seems unrealistic to treat actual hours as if  they 
were chosen freely by the members of  the family. 
This  is  one  of  the  reasons  why  several  recent 
Dutch labor  market  surveys do not  only contain 
information  on actual hours worked, but  also on 
preferred hours, i.e., the number of  hours someone 
would like to work at a given wage rate.3 Preferred 
hours  are  provided  by  respondents  in  a  ceteris 
paribus context, i.e., it is assumed that the partner 
does  not  change  his  or  her  actual  number  of 
working hours.  This  way  of  questioning  implies 
that  preferred  hours  in  the  data  set  are  to be 
interpreted  as  optimal hours,  conditional  on  the 
fact  that  the actual number  of  hours worked  by 
the  partner  is  fixed.  Thus,  a  conditional  labor 
supply  equation  is  needed  to  explain  preferred 
hours. 
Some further explanation may be useful at this 
point.  Of  course,  preferred  hours  are  not  very 
interesting  by  themselves  from  an  economist's 
point  of  view; it is actual hours that we  want to 
study  eventually.  But,  due  to  institutional  con-
straints and demand side factors, preferred hours 
appear to be a better reflection of  the household's 
preferences than  actual hours. Thus, certainly in 
The Netherlands, preferred hours should be used 
to reveal preferences. In a later stage, information 
on  family  preferences  can  be  used  in  a  labor 
market model, in which actual hours are linked to 
preferences as well as institutional constraints and 
demand side factors. 
IV.  An Empirical Example 
In this section, we  present an application of  the 
model  studied  in  section  11.  A  similar  model, 
estimated for a different data set, can be found in 
Kapteyn and Woittiez (1988). In that paper, some 
of  the results derived here have been used. For the 
rest, the Kapteyn and Woittiez paper concentrates 
3A  typical  wording  of  the  survey  question  asking for pre- 
ferred hours is:  "How  many hours  a week  would  you like to 
work  if  you  could  choose freely  and if  your  average  hourly 
wage  rate  remains  as  it  is  now?  Assume  that  other  family 
members do not change their number of working hours."  . HOUSEHOLD LABOR SUPPLY WITH RATIONING  59 

on  different  issues,  particularly  habit  formation 
and  preference  interdependence.  In  our  model 
preferred hours of  husband and wife are the en- 
dogenous variables, for reasons discussed in  sec- 
tion 111. 
A.  Specification of  the Model 
Since each individual provides  his  or her  pre- 
ferred number of  working hours taking the part- 
ner's  actual  labor  supply  as  given,  only  condi- 
tional  labor  supply functions are relevant. Thus, 
from the individual's point of  view the household 
budget set is only two-dimensional. In the absence 
of  non-convexities and  with  a  piece-wise  linear 
budget  constraint,  the optimal number  of  hours 
for each spouse, given the number of  hours worked 
by  the other spouse, can be found by  computing 
conditional  labor  supply  for  each  of  the  linear 
segments, as described by, for example, Hausman 
(1979). If  a spouse is unemployed and receives a 
benefit,  the  budget  set  is  non-convex  and  the 
optimum is found by explicit utility comparison of 
various points. 
Regarding the stochastic specification, it is im- 
portant to distinguish between different sources of 
random errors, i.e., measurement errors, optimiza- 
tion  errors  and  random  preferences. Preference 
variation across households in our model could be 
incorporated  by  allowing, e.g., the parameters 8, 
and af  to depend upon household characteristics: 
where xj  (j  = 1, . . . ,  K) are observed characteris- 
tics (including a constant term) and ci is a random 
variable representing unobserved sources of  pref- 
erence variation. Ths corresponds to translating; 
see McElroy (1987). Random 8's however, lead to 
random  shadow wages  and  a complicated likeli- 
hood function. Moreover, the lack of  global con- 
cavity, as discussed in section IIB, implies that it 
is necessary to truncate the distribution of  the c's 
in some rather intricate way. It is easy to see that 
conditions like (3') or (12) imply that the c's have 
to  lie  in  a polyhedron  and  it  is  hard  to  find  a 
tractable distribution which allows for such a kind 
of  truncation. Although we  do recognize the im- 
portance of  a stochastic specification that  allows 
for random preference variation, the ensuing com- 
plications make this an issue beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
Our stochastic specification is "ad  hoc"  in the 
sense that it only allows for optimization (or mea- 
surement)  errors.  We  add  normally  distributed 
error terms to the conditional labor supply func- 
tions. Thus, for a female not receiving an unem- 
ployment compensation, we have 
hf  = max(0, hf*  + cf) 
wherejhf  is  the  observed  preferred  number  of 
working hours and hf*  is the optimal choice given 
the budget ~onstraint.~ 
If  a female does receive an unemployment com- 
pensation, we  only know whether she is seriously 
looking for a job or not. The optimization error qf 
is incorporated as an error in the "regime choice": 
u = u, - uo+  qf. 
where u, and  uo are the utilities of  working and 
not  working,  respectively.  If  u > 0,  the  female 
wants to work; if  u < 0, she is not seriously look- 
ing  for  a  job.  Male  preferred  labor  supply  is 
treated in the same way. 
The  vector  of  error  terms  (c,,  cf, q,,  qf)'  is 
assumed to follow a normal distribution with mean 
zero and covariance matrix 
or"  . 
An  asterisk indicates  that  the variance does not 
appear in the likelihood function, so that it cannot 
be  estimated.  Because  of  the  small  number  of 
people in the sample receiving an unemployment 
benefit, we  impose cov(cm,  qf) = cov(ef, qm)  = 0, 
and var(q,)  = var(qf ). 
B.  Data and Estimation Results 
The data used stem from a labor mobility sur- 
vey  conducted in The Netherlands in 1982 by the 
Institute of  Social Research of  Tilburg University 
jointly  with  the  Netherlands  Central  Bureau  of 
Statistics. The data set has been  used  by various 
researchers  in  The  Netherlands  for  studies  on 
For individuals  who work less than  15 hours a week, it is 
only known  whether  preferred  hours  exceed  actual hours  or 
not. It is straightforward to take this into account, considering 
hP as a latent variable. 60  THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 
labor supply, labor mobility, and income distribu- 
tion. The survey was held among a random sample 
of  Dutch  households with  at  least one  member 
between  16 and 65  years  of  age. In each house- 
hold, all members between  16 and 65  years have 
been  interviewed. The information collected per- 
tains to incomes, hours worked per week, desired 
working hours per week,  search behavior, demo- 
graphics,  etc.  Non-response  is  equal  to  35.7%. 
Comparison with population characteristics shows 
that the survey is fairly representative of  the popu- 
lation from which it was drawn, although students 
and  unemployed people  appear  to be  somewhat 
underrepresented. Altogether the survey comprises 
2677  persons  in  1299  households.  The  analysis 
here  is  restricted  to  families  with  at  least  two 
adults. Also, self-employed, students, and disabled 
people are omitted from the sample. As  a result, 
data on 520 households were used in the estima- 
tion. 
For  non-participating  individuals  before  tax 
wage  rates  are predicted using  a wage  equation 
with  log(age), log(age)-squared and  education  as 
predictors.  For males and females separate wage 
equations were estimated, using  Heckman's  two- 
stage procedure (see Heckman (1979)). Apart from 
an intercept  a,,  (i = m, f), the  variables on  the 
right hand  side of  (21)  are log(fami1y size) (with 
coefficient 8,)  and a dummy for the presence of 
children younger than six (coefficient ai2). 
The model  was  estimated by  means  of  maxi- 
mum likelih~od.~  To impose concavity of  the cost 
function  in  wages  in  a  relevant  region  of  the 
(h,,  h,,  y)-space,  the  parameter  8  has  been  re-
stricted, i.e.,  an upper  bound  in  terms  of  other 
parameters in the model has been  set to 8, such 
that concavity is guaranteed in all data points;  it 
turns out that this restriction is binding. It should 
be noted that testing of  the restriction is impossi- 
A  table  with  likelihood contributions  is  available  on  re-
quest. The likelihood contributions vary according to whether 
one or two spouses are participating, whether or not the budget 
set is convex, whether or not preferred hours are zero, etc. 
For a positive definite matrix  A, concavity is equivalent to 
(3'). Substituting (19) and (18) into (3') yields 
This restriction-and  a similar one for male labor supply-has 
been imposed for all sample observations. 



















'Covariance  matrix  of  the  parameter  estimates  is  estimated  as  outer 
product. 
bThe estimate  of  8  attains its  upper  bound  (due  to  the  imposition of 
concavity, see footnote 6) so no standard error could be computed. 
ble, since the likelihood is not well-defined under 
the alternative. We have discussed this more fully 
in Van Soest, Kooreman, and Kapteyn (1988). 
Table 1 presents  the  parameter  estimates.  P, 
("the  male  non-labor  income  effect")  is  signifi- 
cantly  negative  and  yf  (representing  the  largest 
part of  the female own wage effect) is significantly 
positive, whereas Pf, a  and y,  do not differ signif- 
icantly from zero. P,  and  Pf  have  the expected 
sign, indicating that leisure is a normal good. The 
variables  concerning  family  composition  play  a 
significant role in the female hours equation but 
not in the male hours equation. A direct economic 
interpretation  for  the  parameters  other  than  P, 
and Pf  is hard to give. The economic meaning of 
the estimates is brought out more clearly by graphs 
and elasticities. 
In  figures  la through  Id family labor  supply 
functions are drawn for a family without children 
as  a  function  of  before-tax  wage  rates.  In each 
case the remaining variables are set at their sample 
means. We  distinguish between "short  run"  (the 
partner is rationed  at a certain number of  hours) 
and "long run" (the partner is not rationed) labor 
supply  functions.  In  each  figure  two  short-run 
labor supply functions are drawn: one for the case 
that actual hours worked by the partner equal the 
sample mean  (hf = 22.6  or  h,  = 42.3)  and  one 
for the case that the partner does not work. Figure 
la  shows a backward bending male labor  supply 
function implying that the negative income effect 61  HOUSEHOLD LABOR SUPPLY WITH RATIONING 
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dominates  the positive own  wage  effect.  Figures 
lb and  lc reveal  the  expected negative relation- 
ship between one's own preferred number of  hours 
and  the partner's  wage  rate,  but  the  effects  are 
small. Figure Id shows that female labor supply is 
forward bending. The own wage impact is much 
larger for the wife than for the husband. Figure Id 
also reveals  the working of  the  tax  system. The 
piece-wise linear progressive tax system leads  to 
jig-sawed responses of  preferred hours to the own 
before-tax wage rate. The reason  for  this is  that 
each time an individual is at a kink in the budget 
constraint, she wants to stay there if  the before-tax 
wage  rate changes a little bit. To stay at a kink 
with an increasing before-tax wage rate entails a 
reduction  of  work  effort. The downward  sloping 
parts in figure Id are hence hyperbolas. The same 
kind  of  non-differentiabilities is  in principle also 
present in figure la, but in this case the hyperbola 
parts are so small that the drawing cannot reveal 
them. This is caused by the small male own wage 
effect. 
The difference in own  wage elasticities is born 
out by figure 2 where some indifference curves are 
depicted, using the results of  section IIC. Figure 
2a shows a few indifference curves upon which the 
husband's decision is based if  his wife works hf= 
22.6 hours; it is easy to see that a change in the 
male wage  rate only has  a very  small impact on 
FIGURE  2.-SOME  IND~FFERENCE  FOR A FAMILY CURVES 
WITHOUT CHILDREN IF THE NUMBER OF WORKING 
HOURS OF ONE  SPOUSE  ARE  FIXED 
the  optimal  number  of  male  working hours.  In 
figure 2b, where the wife's  indifference curves are 
drawn  if  the  husband  works  h, = 42.2  hours  a 
week, the (own) wage impact is much larger (note 
the difference in scale between both figures). 
V.  Conclusions 
Modelling  household  labor  supply  under  dif- 
ferent regimes (i.e., taking  account  of  kinks  and 
corners) requires the use of  shadow prices if  one 
wants to work with specifications that are given in 
dual  form.  Unfortunately,  most  of  the  known 
flexible forms have the undesirable property  that 
shadow prices  cannot  be  found  in  closed  form, 
except  for  some  special cases. The  only  known 
exceptions are the direct quadratic utility function 
and  the Hausman-Ruud  specification. Of  course, 
knowing shadow prices at some point amounts to 
knowing the value of  the direct utility function at 
that point. Indeed, the first thing accomplished in 
thls  paper  is  the  derivation  of  the  direct  utility 
function  corresponding  to  the  Hausman-Ruud 
specification.  Secondly,  the  application  of  ra-
tioning theory requires that the system considered 
satisfies the Slutsky conditions in all data points. 
Hence, we  have imposed concavity conditions for 
all data points  in the  empirical example consid- 
ered. 
A drawback of  the Hausman-Ruud specification 
might seem  to be  that it is  difficult to allow  for 
random preferences in a utility consistent way. At 
first sight the direct quadratic utility function does 
not suffer from such a problem. Ransom (1987b) 
presents  a  specification with  random  errors  and 
provides  conditions  under  which  the  ensuing 
model  is  coherent.  The  conditions  are  easy  to 
impose and  estimation of  the model is relatively 62  THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 
straightforward.  It turns  out,  however,  that  for 
certain values of  the random preferences the bliss 
point  of  the  direct  quadratic  utility  function  is 
inside the budget  constraint,  and in such a case 
the demand  equations  do not  represent  a utility 
maximum. We have shown elsewhere (Van Soest, 
Kooreman, and Kapteyn (1988)), that the restric- 
tions on random preferences required  to prevent 
this  from  happening are quite similar  to  the re- 
strictions  which have to be imposed  on the ran- 
dom preferences in the Hausman-Ruud system to 
parantee a well-behaved system. Therefore, there 
are no compelling a priori reasons to prefer  one 
system or the other. Thus we have two reasonably 
tractable flexible systems available which  can be 
used for the analysis of  household labor supply in 
the presence of  kinks and corners, and the choice 
between them in each case should be based on the 
data at hand. 
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